MUSIC|MEDIA|DESIGN

Sub Pop Records : Daniel Martin Moore : Stray Age LP.

We’re proud to see Sub Pop jumping on Daniel’s bandwagon, and linking the Shake It edition! Very nice, Sub Pop!

Everthing old is new again sooner or later.  The vinyl version, mastered by our own Dave Davis, is part of a trend – low-volume vinyl releases that sell for a little more to select group of fans.  Sure, the medium of vinyl is old as dirt.  Maybe that’s what makes the experience of listening to a record so special.

This is the second vinyl-tagalong we’ve done at Sound Images over the past couple years.  We used the vinyl version of Heartless Bastard’s All This Time to address sonic shortcomings of the CD!  By all accounts, that project was a win.

More is more when it comes to audio data.  But what sounds better?  Clever coding can actually make something sound “better” (but different) from the source.  Whether this is good or bad is a matter of perspective (a CD can be measurably “closer” to a source mix than a vinyl disc, but some prefer the latter for reasons unrelated to “fidelity”).  I thought it would be interesting to compare these real world digital products, to the source CD.  So, I ponied up $0.89 for Amazon, $1.39 for Apple, and dusted off my 1994 remaster of the Stones’ Exile on Main Street for a shoot-out.  While I was at it, I ripped a 128K AAC version (iTunes’ $0.99 fare) using Apple’s tools.  We then compared the bits directly by “subtracting” one file from another, yielding a “residue” containing only the differences.  Surprise:  Amazon’s old-school MP3 was measurably “more like” the source than anything Apple sells!  While the difference isn’t nearly as great as the 128K AAC version, Amazon’s residue is measurably twice as good, with differences evenly spread across the audible spectrum (Apple’s 256 version is most different in the midrange, where we hear best).  Given the AAC codec’s pedigree, I expected it to measure better than MP3.  And in fact, the AAC file does sound better to my ear, and is harder to pick out in blind comparison.  But numbers don’t lie: the absolute fidelity of Amazon’s files is better, and a dime cheaper than the much-crappier 128K standard files from Apple!

Not surprisingly, 256K is kind of a sweet spot for either algorithm, with less aggressive processing.  The benefits of AAC are it’s optimization of midrange frequencies, and coding tricks that get the best audible performance out of low bitrates, like 128K.  At double that rate, the benefits of those tricks are less apparent and differences that make 128K AAC sound “better” to the ear work against the format.

To visualize the “differences” between purchased versions and the CD source check out the image of the waveforms attached above…

The first, giant wave is the original music, next come residue/differences from (in order) Amazon 256K MP3, Apple Plus 256K AAC and finally Apple 128K AAC.  The smaller the residue (i.e. the “difference” between the source file and process under test), the more similar the two files are.  Similarly, when listening to the residue files, the only thing you hear is the difference between the files.  Since we can’t post clips of them without making ourselves targets for major labels, Amazon and Apple, let me describe what you hear in each case, and explain what it means.

The Apple 128K AAC has the largest residue and is by definition the “most different”.  What’s there: intelligible lyrics, plenty of drums (especially cymbals) and a fair amount of piano.  Electric guitar and clear vocals aren’t here at all, but there’s a TON of high frequency content in the top half of the 10th octave (15-20K), corresponding to music that’s simply eliminated in low bitrate AAC and MP3 files.  Average level while playing is approximately -32 dBFS.

The Apple Plus 256K AAC is next in line.  Here the vocals are even more clear, and the residue sounds more musical.  Unlike the 128K, drums are less clear, although cymbals remain pretty noticable, albeit not so much as cymbals but a grungy high frequency noise.  Average level here is -38 dBFS.  For reference, a 6 dB change, like this one between Apple’s 128K and 256K files, represents a halving of volume, or in our case, the file is literally half the loudness of the 128K.  This makes sense: the main difference here is that we’ve doubled the data rate!

The Amazon 256K MP3 is also twice the bitrate, but uses a different algorithm to get there, and thus gets much different results.  Most obvious is level, which is shown above and clearly much quieter.  Specifically, this one averages -44 dBFS, half again what Apple’s best delivers and 4X better than their 99-cent fare!  What you hear in the residue is similar to the Apple Plus: lots of vocals, but more snare and less cymbal, with most differences concentrated in the upper midrange (a little surprising), with peak energy very high up, at 9K.

 So CityBeat and the Cincinnati Entertainment Awards aren’t the only places to notice the Bears new album.  Blog Cosmic Debris reviews their Car Caught Fire release!

I mastered the record at QCA Mastering, with plenty of care and help from the band.  What a blast!  It went on to win the Cincinnati Entertainment Award for Album of the Year in 2001.  You never know what a record’s gonna do until you put it out.  This one worked out well!

City Beat‘s Mike Breen has tied up many loose ends in the History of The Bears in his Spill It piece, Bear Talk.  It not only highlights the band’s latest record, Eureka! (pictured above), it chronicles the band’s long history and features an interview with guitarist/singer Rob Fetters.

In the interview Rob discusses the current “Loudness Wars” and the band’s response to them.  As the mastering engineer on the project at Sound Images, I can back him up – we took great care to avoid smashing out the life and dynamics of the record, while still hitting commercially viable levels.  It’s a pure trade-off: Louder records are inherently less dynamic, making them sound worse at higher volumes, because there’s no variation.  When everything is loud, you can’t have soft parts.  And over time, music without soft parts is pretty boring!

Since their 2001 release Car Caught Fire (mastered by me as well, at QCA Mastering) average loudness on CDs has only climbed.  So Eureka! presented a real challenge, maintaining continuity with The Bear’s excellent-sounding catalog without sounding dated.  Based on the comments by fans in the CityBeat article, I think we nailed it.

It’s hard to imagine a worse disaster for the media world than the proposed XM/Sirius merger. In spite of the hoopla, assurances, and analysis, on every level, this deal stinks by definition. While we firmly reject “zero-sum” economic models, we recognize real benefits in competition. There’s plenty of pie to go around, as long as the pie keeps growing. Competition and risk drive innovation, which in turn enables growth. Lack of competition results in market stagnation. Stagnant markets not only don’t grow, but evaporate! Take a closer look at how this merger will affect the media market.

Consumers will be hit first, if not worst, by this change. First and foremost, subscription prices will be disconnected from a real market. After you’ve invested in special hardware to listen, especially in-dash systems, you are more likely to accept a non-stop stream of small increases over time. Like health care costs, the lack of direct competition and the false appearance of choice (does DBS really compete with free radio?) mean there will be no disincentive for regular price increases.

Direct Broadcast Satellite systems are enormous technological undertakings, requiring enormous capital outlays. Since the turn of the century, XM and Sirius have continuously pushed the technology, increasing channels and quality, while making subscriptions affordable. As a result of their competition, XM has developed technology superior to their sole competitor, Sirius. Meanwhile Sirius focused on new content models, developing programming that differs from conventional radio, alongside more open talk formats, like Howard Stern’s shows, which drove subscriptions. While a merger will certainly reduce infrastructure costs, and improve Sirius’ technology and XM’s programming, the incentive to innovate in either arena will largely disappear. Today both companies deliver superior programming compared to most terrestrial broadcasts, by any measure, because they must out-do each other in the race for subscribers in a mutually exclusive market. After a merger the competition returns to earth. DBS will have to be better than broadcast radio and cable/web based “music choice” channels and home made podcasts, but the strongest competitor for each company will vanish overnight. So much for innovative programming.

Investors of both companies are also losers. While competition meant significant risk for all shareholders, it guaranteed significant reward for those of at least one company. In the worst case, the weaker broadcaster might collapse entirely, but with good management and innovation it shouldn’t be hard (much less impossible) for them to survive on less than half of a market much larger than todays. The nearly inevitable outcome of their current battle is more receivers and subscription for both, the only question is who gets more. Competition is harder than riding the gravy train for sure, but it grows the train and creates more gravy. Here’s what we know for sure: Given that there are THREE major TV networks, a few more major radio networks, dozens of cable system operators, hundreds of cable networks and literally thousands of individual broadcasters in the US alone, there are more than enough subscribers for two satellite radio systems.

It appears the management of both companies are colluding to drive down the cost of programming. The status quo has given B list celebs and radio personalities enormous raises, relative to their previous earnings on terrestrial networks. Launching and maintaining a system of satellites, not to mention creating, marketing and supporting receivers and constantly developing software is not an inexpensive proposition. The merger’s immediate effect on that investment is to severely discount one of the two company’s ground-side technology (which amortized over time becomes a long term drag on profits). There are some savings in administration, and some potential savings in consolidating facilities. But the biggest savings of all are to be found when it’s time to negotiate talent contracts and deals. Given the state of terrestrial broadcasting and podcasting, for the real stars, DBS has suddenly become a one horse town. The same is true in music: Satellite already has a better deal than webcasters, but if their music channels become star-making vehicles as radio once was, expect that deal to improve.

This deal has no winners, but it’s not really about that. It’s an early venture in “dataculture”, and like early agriculture, there are some bugs to work out of the model. These competitors have recognized the facts presented here, and determined that while the rewards accrue slowly but steadily, risk is a constant. XM and Sirius have decided that since upside growth is largely fixed (audience can never exceed population) they are better off sharing the rewards, than driving up the cost of goods through competitive pressures and adding to their risk. This merger is all about eliminating the possibility of losing at an opportune moment in time (before the next round of talent bidding and technology upgrades begin).

So what’s the problem? First, one of these companies stands to “win” in today’s market, and in the process define the norms for both company’s future survival. Merging eliminates the rewards for the winners entirely, while guaranteeing the “losers” investment is no longer at risk (removing all possibility of rebound or turnarounds that happen all the time in every market). Similarly consumer choice will be eliminated, putting it entirely on government regulators to protect their existing investment in hardware, and subscription decisions they’ve already made. Finally artists and creative talent suffer severely when there is no competition. Entertainment monopolies are among the most difficult to police and prosecute once they get rolling, and their effect on the market has historically never been positive. This deal really smells bad for everyone other than the executives and big-time investors who are using it to hedge past bad bets.

Dave Davis
Media Designer . Sound Images

Many bands release CDs, win contests and awards, occupy stages, and generally impress friends, fans and wow the local music scene. At the end of the day, too many have too little to show for all this recognition. Indeed, some wind up reviled for their success: bands getting noticed often find themselves at the center of conspiracy theories spun by other bands about music journalists and collusion between Bob’s House of CDs, the Mafia, Big Radio and the Illuminati-run Major Labels!

Wake up! Any modicum of success you achieve locally will naturally be followed with recognition in the local press, and yes, familiarity and personal relationships with members of the music press. This is not a bad thing, or a nefarious inside plot to cut every other band out of every opportunity that comes along. Its just human nature. More important, its something that can work for your band as easily as anyone else lucky and talented enough to be noticed and recognized.

If your goal is to be a local music icon, that goal is eminently achievable through those human relationships, and over time its almost inevitable… if youhave talent keep plugging away. If you want more than that, the road is a bit longer, a lot harder, and the obstacles much higher. Unlike local music sainthood, this one is never assured, and always a tenuous roller coaster ride. This article may or may not help you reach those higher goals, but it might give you a leg up on the former, and help you manage whatever success does come your way. It’s primarily targeted at bands who are releasing CDs.

Let me start with a model of acknowledged, proven, undeniable success. Motown Records started off as a local Detroit label, created by a jazz fanatic who owned a record store. He saw a lot of great jazz artists floundering hopelessly in the marketplace, the jazz scene thriving even as musicians starved. The genius of Barry Gordy was not that he was able to locate, attract and develop pop acts to the exclusion of the jazz artists he loved. Rather it was his insight into the fundamental nature of the business itself, and his approach to marketing and merchandising records in a way major labels could barely fathom, much less emulate. Interestingly, his techniques could be more successful in today’s wired world than they were in the 1960′s, but I’m getting ahead of myself.

The Motown formula was simple: A band was developed fully before any products were released. Once the band was ready, a record was cut. It wasn’t released nationwide because Gordy realized that having your disc on the shelf of a store in Peoria for a year before you ever played there or heard it on the radio virtually guaranteed it would be returned to the distributor before the band came through town. Instead, Motown staggered releases to coincide with tour stops which coincided with national media exposure (American Bandstand et al). When a band was in a town they’d do interviews in local media, and the records would magically appear in stores. Eventually as a band worked its way across the country, they’d hit gold sales levels, and have virtually NO returned product. By contrast, a major label band might sell gold, but get half of that returned unsold, or played and returned as bad product. The major label band would be charged for returns, and the label would claim to lose money. Gordy’s bands paid Motown more money for all kinds of services, and made less money per unit than Capitol or Columbia acts. But, at the end of the day what the artists forget to mention (or are simply unaware of) is that they netted more than major label bands because the money was well spent, and there were no returns.

Gordy was a stickler for two things: Quality and efficiency. He dumped poor product before consumers ever saw it, much less returned it (an efficiency in itself), and never wasted a moment of energy or a dollar of capital if it could be avoided… when it was unavoidable, people were accountable, and the entire organization learned from the mistakes.

Bands, left to their own devices are classic models of inefficiency. Worse, bands don’t just miss their own mistakes, but they seem determined to repeat the mistakes of others. The key to resolving both of these problems lie in record keeping, planning and analysis. A business journal can be as simple as a checkbook, but if you can put your bands records into something like Quicken, thats even better: it not only lets you categorize your expenses, but it also gives you a window on your successes and failures. Virtually every expense of a working band is tax deductable, and the government gives you a few years to make a profit so you can write a lot off in the meantime (of course you’ll never show a profit, but they don’t have to know you know).

This helps in a less obvious way. Many bands look in the back of Mix magazine, find a place that will press 1000 CDs for $1000, send off their parts, and brag to their friends about how cheap the CDs were. Spending money piecemeal makes it easy to forget all the little costs that add up over the course of a project. Even bands who get the “Full Ride” at Discmakers or Oasis don’t really know how much their release costs. Bands happily piss away a couple hundred promos to relatives and friends with imaginary “connections”, A&R people who toss them in the trash, and all kinds of other things. They turn around and sell CDs off the stage, full of punk ethos and DIY Cred for $5, smugly believing they’re making $3.20 a pop. Unfortunately, that’s not the case, or even close. In fact, they’re probably LOSING $2-4 per disc. A program like Quicken and a group checking account could make this clear. For the doubters, spitting coffee on your screens as you read this, I direct you to the next post where I break this down. For everyone else, I’ll continue with my thoughts.

Analysis is handy because it gives you a better view of things. You can identify problems before they become crises. In the above example there’s a simple solution: charge more for your CDs. To actually GET more money from fans for your product is another story. And, even if you do manage to sell them for more, on margins this slim you have to make sure you sell a good percentage of the numbers you plan on. This adds up to the simple reality that Barry Gordy understood intuitively: Efficiency and quality must be givens, not “nice to haves”.

Like everything there are always cases of diminishing returns. I’m not suggesting you need to spend as much time as Michael Jackson in the studio, nor do you need a 20 page full color booklet. You do however need to have good sounding music that impresses reviewers, fans and djs who might actually play your music. A sharp looking, nicely printed package when viewed OUTSIDE the shrinkwrap helps a lot. Spelling errors on the tray card are a bright red idiot light (one local release was pressed with known spelling errors because they couldn’t afford to have thier $200 film reburned, and the cheapo plant charged for revisions. Doh!). Upside down spine labels scream “Amateur Product Here”. Cloudy discs, or worse unplayable product isn’t unheard of, and reflect badly on the band and cost future sales.

Efficiency means you can’t afford to do things more than once. You do a job, focus on it, and do it right. Figuring out a cool, slick lead in the studio, or for that matter, at home alone isn’t a great idea for a low budget project. Work it out IN PRACTICE, where the rest of the band can hear it, give you input or if need be, nix it.

Mixing is a process where you can spend 4 hours getting the drums right on one song. The second song might only take 2 hours total since that’s together. If you have to remix just one song, you’re often starting from scratch, so you should pay attention during the mix, not talk, not call your girl/boy friend. If you are glazing, leave the control room and hang out in the studio or lounge and come back when things are closer. Try to mix similar songs on a single session. If you mix over 3-4 days, you can create 3 different drum sounds and mix them up in the CD sequence. Change vocal effects, guitar sounds, whatever else you want to add texture. The drum sounds take longest to set up, so you can make the process more efficient by using a few of those and a lot of other elements. Pick the low hanging fruit!

You are the worst judge of your music. The song you think is the sure fire single is probably the turd. Likewise the song fans love is the one you hate playing the most. When selecting songs to demo or use as MP3s or singles, ask someone NOT in the band. The least connected the better: you’re looking for the songs that resonate with strangers, not with your girl/boy friend.

Releasing a CD is not something you do for an evening. This isn’t a 13 year old masturbation fantasy where you furiously jerk yourself then fall asleep. In fact, most bands sell a single title for a year or two. Another key fact: Bands tend to sell most of their product close to release date. Hopefully the lights coming on and the Motown Connection is firing in your brain: the closer you can get to making EVERY gig a CD release party, the better. Obviously this isn’t possible, especially in a local setting. But it IS possible on a regional basis. It’s all about managing the release sequence, not to mention your own time and energy. Again, efficiency is key. I’ll get deeper into that broader concept in part 3.

CDs sold at shows tend to be directly transduced into beer. This urge must be fought. Yes, you will surely spend the $30-40 of sales at a typical gig in collective drink. But the fact is if you sold NO CDs you would still drink $30-40 worth of alcohol. Why discourage yourself in a long term process? You are already planning your next release, cataloging all the things you’ll do differently. Make it easier to reach those goals, and make sure the money at least makes a stop in the bands previously mentioned Quicken ledger and bank account. Bands can easily make $2000 profit on a release, which in theory means you can spend the same amount on the next one, PLUS a little more, and buy some other gear along the way, or promote the next one better. Unfortunately if you piss away the profits a few dollars at a time you reach the last box and discover you’re still as broke as you were when you paid for the order.

These are the big, obvious things. If you TRULY address these issues you’re ahead of most bands. Many bands think they know all this and are as pure as driven snow with respect to these sins, but don’t bother to plan or keep the necessary records to provide real insight and opportunity. The next section is simply a “proof of concept” to demonstrate how things really add up, and why you should count. If you accept that premise, skip the math and go directly to section 3. Section 3, Conservation of Energy for Maximum Results, contains specific tactics for addressing these problems.

Thank God for CityBeat!  Without them, one of Cincy’s most unique and interesting bands would be criminally under-exposed.  Thanks to the alt-weekly’s coverage, natives were introduced to Culture Queer’s 2006 Super-Size It Under Pontius Pilate.  It only went on to win the annual Cincinnati Entertainment Award for Album of the Year!  Yeah, it’s that good.

But in the outside world, you’d never know the earth moved.  We were able to find this album review in Smother Magazine.  Indie music blog PopMatters managed to drop this dismissive short-take.  Not good enough.  This band deserves much more!